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Abstract
We explore the possibilities of enforcing and preventing consensus in
continuous opinion dynamics that result from modifications in the com-
munication rules. We refer to the model of Weisbuch and Deffuant, where
n agents adjust their continuous opinions as a result of random pairwise
encounters whenever their opinions differ not more than a given bound
of confidence ε. A high ε leads to consensus, while a lower ε leads to
a fragmentation into several opinion clusters. We drop the random en-
counter assumption and ask: How small may ε be such that consensus
is still possible with a certain communication plan for the entire group?
Mathematical analysis shows that ε may be significantly smaller than in
the random pairwise case. On the other hand we ask: How large may
ε be such that preventing consensus is still possible? In answering this
question we prove Fortunato’s simulation result that consensus cannot be
prevented for ε > 0.5 for large groups. Next we consider opinion dynamics
under different individual strategies and examine their power to increase
the chances of consensus. One result is that balancing agents increase
chances of consensus, especially if the agents are cautious in adapting
their opinions. However, curious agents increase chances of consensus
only if those agents are not cautious in adapting their opinions.
Keywords: Continuous opinion dynamics; bounded confidence; commu-
nication structure; balancing agents; curious agents.
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1 Introduction
What happens if people meet and discuss their opinions regarding a political
party, a brand, or a new product? Generally, when people meet they influence
one another and as a consequence may change their opinions. Such opinion
formation processes are at the heart of models that explain voting behavior as
well as models of innovation diffusion (see for instance [1]).
If people who are assumed to have opinions toward something meet and dis-
cuss, they may adapt their opinions towards the other agent’s opinion and reach
a compromise or they may move away from consensus when their initial posi-
tions are too different as well as they could ignore each other. For simplification
we only consider one-dimensional opinions such that they can be represented
by real numbers between zero and one. We will only examine compromising
agents under bounded confidence, which implies that individuals who differ too
much in their opinions do not affect and thus ignore each other. This assump-
tion mirrors the psychological concept of selective exposure, where people tend
to perceive their environment in favor of their own opinions and thereby avoid
communication with people with conflicting opinions. However, if agents do not
ignore each other, then they get closer in their opinions. Such systems of agents,
who update their opinions via averaging with other sufficiently similar opinions,
are referred to as systems of continuous opinion dynamics under bounded con-
fidence. Models following this paradigm were proposed by Hegselmann and
Krause [2, 3] and Weisbuch, Deffuant, and others [4, 5]. In the Hegselmann and
Krause model (HK model) every agent perceives the opinions of every other
agent and builds his new opinion as an average of sufficiently close opinions.
Thereby Hegselmann and Krause added the assumption of bounded confidence
to a previous linear opinion dynamics model by DeGroot [6, 7]. Hegselmann and
Krause’s main question was what conditions related to the bounded confidence,
in other words the degree of open mindedness, are necessary for a consensus to
be reached.
While in Hegselman and Krause all agents interact simultaneously, the agents
in the model by Weisbuch and Deffuant (WD model) engage in random pair-
wise encounters. Several other extensions (e.g. in [8]) and a combination of
both models, the HK model and the WD model, [9] have been analyzed. A
model which includes the centrifugal forces of rejecting agents is proposed by
Jager [10]. Opinion dynamics models were also examined in incompletely linked
networks, for instance in scale-free networks [11, 12].
While the conditions necessary for consensus were already examined regard-
ing the bounded confidence, we will explore conditions affecting the rules of
communication in the sense of who talks with whom. Even if we regard a com-
pletely linked society as given and thus look at the WD model, this model has
an unexplored free parameter in the order of who communicates with whom at
what time. We will call rules that modify this order the communication regime.
Studying this parameter is the aim of this paper. Considering the complexity
of human organizations and the different institutions that foster or manipulate
the communication regime, makes immediately clear why this question is of rel-
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evance. We will see that although the bounds of confidence have a significant
impact also the factors that control the communication regime significantly af-
fect the emergence of consensus or dissent. Thus, our two leading questions
are: To what extent does the communication regime matter? Do individual
communication rules like being balancing or being curious matter? To focus
our analysis we concentrate on possibilities and strategies to foster or prevent
consensus.
The above-mentioned models on opinion dynamics, i.e. WD model and HK
model, were previously studied with the more general technique of differen-
tial equations on density based state spaces instead of single agents in finite
populations[13, 14, 15]. However, we will apply these questions to populations
of finite size, more precisely, less than one thousand members. This prevents
us from using such general techniques that abstract from single agents. Never-
theless, it is interesting because it is a more realistic assumption. The model
assumes a completely mixed population where everybody has the same chance
of interacting with everybody else. However, in human societies the size of
groups, where one can reasonably assume a complete mixing, does not scale
arbitrarily. For instance, Zhou et al. [16] and Hill and Dunbar [17] argue that
some group sizes are more frequently observed than others and that at certain
critical number, groups exhibit significantly different properties in, for instance,
their communication patterns. The organizational literature also suggests that
beyond critical sizes, hierarchies will be established. Furthermore, the distri-
bution of people across different geographical locations also restricts the set
of potential interaction partners. All these aspects suggest that for very large
systems the assumption of completely mixed societies is strongly violated. We
believe that these arguments demonstrate the necessity of investigating finitely
sized groups if one sticks to the complete mixing assumption.1 Although finite
size is often associated with a difficult analysis, we will demonstrate that for
opinion dynamics this approach in some circumstances still lends itself to an
analytical approach.
After a short introduction of the Weisbuch and Deffuant model, we answer
the question concerning the extent to which the communication regime is able to
enforce or prevent consensus. We will see that the results of Deffuant, Weisbuch,
and others are not robust against manipulation of the communication order.
The result on preventing consensus supports Fortunato’s claim of universality of
the threshold for complete consensus [11]. Fortunato provides simulation-based
evidence that consensus is reached for ε > 0.5 irrespective of the structure of an
underlying connected social network. Our result will explicitly define a threshold
such that for larger bounds of confidence consensus cannot be prevented. In
this way the simulation results by Fortunato are formally proved without any
1 One should be aware that research regarding certain social and economic phenomena are
only based on the assumption of finite sizes, e.g. theory on competition among firms. In fact,
the infinite size assumption may sometimes represent the most uninteresting case. As such we
suggests that in the social sciences the infinite size assumption should not be treated as the
undiscussed default. At the very least, a justification that violating the finite size assumption
does not cause a major change in system behavior is critical.
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simulation, but in the limit of large numbers of agents and uniformly distributed
initial opinions. However, we also show how the result differs for populations
of different finite sizes. For instance, for ε below a specific level there is a zero
probability of consensus in finite populations, while the level depends on the
groups size and the cautiousness of agents.
The communication regime we construct in section 3 to reach the extreme
bounds for preventing and enforcing consensus relies on full knowledge of the
opinions of all agents. To circumvent this, in section 4 we run a simulation
analysis with individual strategies, where agents are either balancing or curi-
ous. This only requires that agents know their individual recent communication
history. ’Balancing’ means that an agent who has talked with somebody who
has a higher opinion seeks later on somebody with a lower one. ’Curious’ means
that agents seek partners with opinion in the same direction as those of their for-
mer communication partners. Particularly the interplay of these strategies with
the cautiousness that agents exhibit is interesting. We will see that these very
simple communication strategies, that could reasonably be applied by humans,
can significantly increase the chances for consensus.
2 Dynamics of continuous opinions
We analyze the model of continuous opinion dynamics that was introduced by
Weisbuch, Deffuant, and others [4, 5]. The dynamics are driven by random
encounters of two agents, who compromise if their distance in opinions is below
a certain bound of confidence ε. The model always converges to a stabilized
opinion formation, where agents in the same cluster have the same opinion in
the long run [18].
We consider n ∈ N agents, who each have an opinion that is represented by
a real number. The opinion of agent i ∈ n := {1, . . . , n} at time step t ∈ N0 is
represented by xi(t) ∈ R. We call the vector x(t) ∈ Rn the opinion profile at
time step t.
Definition 1 (WD model) Given an initial opinion profile x(0) ∈ Rn, a
bound of confidence ε ∈ R>0, and a cautiousness parameter2 µ ∈]0, 0.5] we
define the WD model as a process of opinion dynamics as the random process
(x(t))t∈N0 that chooses in each time step t ∈ N0 two agents i and j randomly
and equally distributed from the set of agents n. Agents i and j perform the
2This parameter is called convergence parameter in [4].
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action
if |xi(t)− xj(t)| < ε
xi(t+ 1) = (1− µ)xi(t) + µxj(t),
xj(t+ 1) = µxi(t) + (1− µ)xj(t),
else
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t), xj(t+ 1) = xj(t).
The bound of confidence ε was previously shown to be the most significant
parameter to control the number of emerging clusters. For randomly distributed
initial profiles with opinions between zero and one x ∈ [0, 1]n and n = 1000 it is
shown via simulations that consensus is reached nearly in every case for ε > 0.3
[4]. For lower ε the usual outcome is polarization into a certain number of
opinion clusters. Weisbuch, Deffuant et al. derived by computer simulation the
’1/2ε-rule’, which states that the number of surviving clusters is roughly the
integer part of 1/2ε.3
The cautiousness parameter µ had been considered to have no effect on clus-
tering in the basic model (only on convergence time) [4, 5]. However, there is
already some evidence that µ can affect the clustering as well as that the effect
of µ interacts with other parameters, e.g. number of agents that participate in
an interaction [9, 19]. Furthermore, different random initial profiles may lead to
different numbers of clusters, and even the same initial profile may lead to dif-
ferent numbers of clusters for different random choices of communicating pairs.
In most previous studies the dependence on the initial profile and on the com-
munication regime is not considered due to the randomness assumption. In the
next section we will incorporate both, initial opinion profile and communication
regime, to examine the bounds for enforcing and preventing consensus.
3 Enforcing and Preventing Consensus
In this section we give mathematical answers to the questions: How small may
ε be such that enforcing consensus is still possible? How large may ε be such
that preventing consensus is still possible?
Let our initial opinion profile x(0) and the parameter µ be fixed. We define
εlow as the smallest value of epsilon for which there is a communication regime
that leads to a consensus. Obviously, εlow depends on the initial opinion profile
and perhaps on µ. We will give a lower and an upper limit for εlow based on a
communication regime that looks like a phone chain of those persons with the
most similar opinions, or in other words a phone chain of closest.
For our approximation we must take a detailed look at the initial opinion
profile. For this reason we regard our initial opinion profile x(0) as ordered such
3Very small surviving clusters are neglected by this rule, but their existence is systematic
as shown by the analysis of a rate equation for the density of opinions [13].
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that x1(0) ≤ · · · ≤ xn(0), without loss of generality. For our considerations
it is useful to look at the gaps between the opinions. We define for i ∈ n− 1
the gap to the next neighbor as ∆xi(t) := xi+1(t) − xi(t). If we regard an
opinion profile as a function x(·)(t) : n→ R then we can consider ∆x(t) ∈ Rn−1
as the discrete derivative of x(t) with respect to the agent index i. ∆ is thus
not a differential but a difference operator. For abbreviation we further define
the maximal gap max ∆x := maxi∈n ∆xi. In our setting with ordered initial
opinions, the function x(·)(0) is monotonously increasing. Thus its difference
function ∆x(·)(0) is non-negative.
We are now able to define the phone chain of closest as a communication
regime, which will later on guide us to a fair approximation of εlow.
Definition 2 (phone chain of closest) Let n ∈ N be the number of agents.
A WD model of opinion dynamics is ruled by a phone chain of closest if the
communicating agents at time step t ∈ N are (t mod (n−1))+1 and (t mod (n−
1)) + 2.
The phone chain of closest is (1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), . . . , (n− 1, n), (1, 2), and so
forth. This sequencing communication strategy provides a nice proof for the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let x(0) ∈ Rn be an ordered initial profile and let µ ∈]0, 0.5].
It holds that
max ∆x(0) ≤ εlow ≤ max
i∈n−1
i−1∑
j=0
µj∆xi−j(0). (1)
For a proof see appendix A.1. Figure 1 shows how the phone chain of closest
works.4
If we define range(x) =
∑
i∈n−1 ∆xi = xn − x1 and d·e as rounding a real
value to the upper integer, then we can derive a corollary with a simpler but
not as sharp bound.
Corollary 1 If proposition 1 holds, then it also holds that
εlow ≤ 1− µ
d range(x(0))max ∆x(0) e
1− µ max ∆x(0) (2)
For a proof see appendix A.2.
From corollary 1 one can see that εlow is determined mostly by the maximal
gap, µ, and the ratio of the maximal gap and the difference between the two
most extreme opinions in the initial profile. For µ = 0.5 the estimate shows,
that enforcing consensus is always possible for ε which is twice the maximal gap
of the initial profile.
4We suspect that our estimate is not strict, because we also studied regimes other than
the phone chain of closest. However, the phone chain of closest delivers the best result we are
able to prove analytically. Yet, the question of the strictly lowest εlow is still open.
6
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
phone chain of closest, n = 50, ε = 0.1, 70 time steps
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phone chain of closest, n = 50, ε = 0.1, 20000 time steps
Figure 1: The phone chain communication regime of closest.
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Simulation-based studies often use initial profiles x(0) ∈ [0, 1]n with random
and uniformly distributed opinions. The length of the maximal gap in such a
profile can be estimated by Whitworth’s formula (3) and is thereby dependent
on the number of agents.
P (max ∆x > ε) =
b 1ε c∑
k=1
(−1)k+1(1− kε)n−1
(
n
k
)
. (3)
In terms of statistical theory the formula is about the spacings in an order
statistics of n independent uniformly distributed random variables (see [20]).
Figure 2 shows the probability that the maximal gap is larger than ε with
ε ∈ [0, 1].
0 0.1 0.2
0
0.5
1
P(
ma
x ∆
 
X 
> 
x)
x
n=1000
n=200 n=50
Figure 2: P (max ∆x > ε) for random equally distributed x ∈ Rn for some n.
Based on this distribution it is possible to derive an estimate for the ex-
pected size of the maximal gap in an initial opinion profile. But it gives an
additional insight: the larger the population the smaller the expected size of
the maximal gap. This leads to the conclusion that for a very large number
of agents who are equally distributed, consensus is possible for extremely low
values of ε. If we assume that the maximal gap converges to zero as the number
of agents increases, then it is possible to reach consensus for every ε with a large
enough number of agents. However, a reasoning on infinitely many agents is not
appropriate since every real society is finite in size. This finite size assumption
is where many analytic approaches reach their limit.
We now ask the other way around: How large may ε be such that preventing
consensus is still possible? At first we see that this question is not detailed
enough to be interesting. Preventing consensus is obviously possible if we forbid
one agent to communicate with all others, e.g. by underlying a disconnected
social network. The right question is: How high may ε be such that preventing
consensus is still possible, even if we switch at some time step to an arbitrary
communication regime? The biggest possible ε is called εhigh.
Proposition 2 Let x(0) ∈ Rn be an ordered initial profile and let 0 < µ < 0.5.
εhigh = max
k∈n−1
 1
n− k
n∑
i=k+1
xi(0)− 1
k
k∑
j=1
xj(0)
 (4)
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For a proof see appendix A.3 and lemma 1, which states that the mean
opinion is conserved by the process of opinion formation.
If we regard random and uniformly distributed xi(0) ∈ [0, 1] for an n ap-
proaching infinity, then εhigh is computed as the distance of the central points
of two arbitrary disjoint intervals whose union is [0, 1]. Thus, εhigh → 0.5 as
n→∞. This proves the Fortunato’s universality result [11] by showing that pre-
venting consensus is impossible for a large enough number of connected agents
for ε > 0.5. Furthermore, Fortunato delivers evidence that consensus is not
possible for ε < 0.5 as n → ∞ and random pairwise communication regardless
of an underlying network topology. Proposition 1 shows that there are specific
communication orders that lead the society to consensus even for very low val-
ues of ε for every finite but arbitrarily large number of agents. However, the
probability of obtaining one of these consensus-enforcing communication orders
when picking it out of the set of random pairwise communication orders would
probably approach zero in the limit of large n. Hence, if we are free to choose
or to influence the communication order, then Fortunato’s claim that consensus
is not possible for ε < 0.5 is disproved. It remains to prove the impossibility of
consensus for ε < 0.5 under random pairwise communication in the sense that
our consensus enforcing communication orders approach a probability of zero
as n increases.
The interval [εlow, εhigh] is the range where both enforcing and preventing
consensus is possible with an appropriate communication regime. Both bounds
of the interval depend on the initial profile x(0). Figure 3 provides some numeri-
cal evidence about the possibilities that can be reached with manipulation of the
communication regime. The data in line one come from figure 4 in [4] (visually
extracted) with 250 simulation runs with random and equally distributed initial
profiles and n = 1000. For line two we took 250 randomly chosen and equally
distributed profiles with n = 1000 and show the maximal εlow and minimal
εhigh that occurred in all 250 profiles (all computed with propositions 1 and 2).
Enforcing and preventing consensus was possible in the displayed interval for
all 250 selected profiles. The same is true in line three for n = 200.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
1
2
3
ε−phases
1 cluster = consensus2 clust.pluralism
1 and 2 clusters possible, n = 1000
1 and 2 clusters possible, n = 200
Figure 3: Numerical [εlow, εhigh] (second darkest gray) where consensus and
polarization occurs (1) and is possible (2 and 3).
From this figure we can also see that for finite populations and random initial
profiles avoiding consensus is possible even for ε > 0.5 (in contrast to Fortunato).
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The larger the population the smaller ε can be while still guaranteeing the
possibility of consensus. The larger the population the smaller is the upper
limit of ε for which consensus can be prevented.
4 Individual strategies that increase chances for
consensus
In the previous section we applied a mechanism for enforcing consensus that was
built on knowledge about all people’s opinions. We now want to leave behind
this idea of global knowledge and the great master plan for communication and
go to agent based strategies, which may also promote consensus. Our agents do
not know the opinions of all other agents and thus do not know if they are in
the center or at the extremes of the opinion space. The agents follow rules that
only require knowledge of their own communication history.
4.1 Balancing and curious agents with directions
From the huge set of possible individual communication strategies we focus
on balancing and curious agents. Consider an agent who has communicated
with another agent and adapted his opinion accordingly. A balancing agent
will now search for an agent whose opinion is contrary to that of the previous
communication partner, while ignoring all other agents. A curious agent will
instead seek out a new communication partner whose opinion is in line with
that of the previous communication partner, again ignoring other agents.
To prevent agents from not finding an agent to compromise with, we intro-
duce a new parameter, fmax, which represents a maximal level of frustration.
Specifically, it is the number of unsuccessful attempts a agent sticks to the rule
before abandoning it. Thus, agents are not forced to follow the strategies for
ever. We store relative opinions of potential communication partners, more pre-
cisely, the direction, and individual frustration levels for all agents in a vector
d ∈ Zn. If di is negative, then agent i wants to compromise with an agent with
a lower opinion. If di is positive, then agent i wants to compromise with an
agent with a higher opinion. If di is zero agent i has no preferred direction. The
absolute values of the directions represent the frustration level. The lower the
absolute value the higher is the frustration; if it reaches zero, then the agents
does not care anymore about the direction of potential communication partners.
Frustration and direction are additional factors that affect agents tendency
to compromise. Agents i and j only compromise if both agents’ opinions are
in the corresponding set of opinions the other agent looks for, i.e. di ∗ dj ≤ 0.
If they are not in the set, but are closer than  to each other, then they both
reduce the absolute value of their frustration levels each by one point. Thus the
absolute values of di and dj decrease. After a successful compromise, agents set
di to fmax with the sign indicating the new search direction. Curious agents
differ from balancing agents in the sign of di. Besides this restriction we return
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to random pairwise communication. The corresponding pseudo-code can be
found in B.
Societies of balancing and curious agents are essentially identical in their
dynamics if µ = 0.5. It is interesting to note that after a compromise between
two balancing agents we end up with two agents with the same opinion searching
in opposite directions; however, the same applies to curious agents but with
agents whose indices are reversed. Thus, clustering outcomes are identical for
both balancing and curious agents when µ = 0.5.
4.2 Simulation setup
For both strategies, balancing and curious agents, we ran simulations for the val-
ues µ = 0.2, 0.5, n = 50, 100, 200, ε = 0,+0.01. . . , 0.35, and fmax = 0, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32.
For each point in this parameter space we have 3000 independent simulation runs
with random initial profiles and random selection of communication partners.5
Each simulation run stops when we reach a configuration where all indirectly
connected6 subgroups of agents have a maximal opinion difference smaller than
ε and thus cannot further split. The mean preserving property (see lemma
1 in A.3) of the dynamics permits a calculation of the long term limit of the
convergence process. We consider the average size of the biggest cluster after
stabilization as a measure for the possibility of consensus.7 All simulations were
implemented using ANSI-C. The program code is available on request from the
second author.
4.3 Simulation results
Figure 4 shows the results for the average size of the biggest cluster. The fat
line always represents the average size of the biggest cluster for fmax = 0 and
n = 200. The upper left plot shows how this line changes for varying numbers
of agent. The plateau at ε = 0.2 shows the characteristic polarization phase
where agents form two big clusters (see for instance in [4]). We see that this
plateau becomes more pronounced for larger n and less distinct for smaller n.8
Next, we examine how the transition from polarization to consensus shifts
to other ε-regions when agents are balancing or curious. We concentrate our
discussion on the case of 200 agents, but we checked that the shifts for n =
50, 100, 500, 1000 are similar.9
5To check larger numbers of agents, we performed 3000 independent simulation runs for
balancing agents for n = 500, 1000, ε = 0,+0.01. . . , 0.35, µ = 0.2, 0.5, and fmax = 0, 1, 2, 4, 8.
6Two agents are connected if their opinions differ by not more than ε. They are indirectly
connected if there is a chain of connected agents between them.
7Another possible measure would be the average number of clusters. But the Weisbuch
and Deffuant model is known to produce minor clusters of only a few agents [13, 21].
8The small ’hill’ at ε = 0.19 for n = 500, 1000 is another interesting phenomenon related
to the measure of the average size of the biggest cluster, but it is outside of the scope of this
paper.
9Data for n = 50, 100, 500, 1000 is available on request from the second author.
11
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
ε
a
ve
ra
ge
 s
ha
re
 o
f b
ig
ge
st
 c
lu
st
er
µ = 0.5, f
max
=0, n=50,100,200,500,1000
50
100
200
500
1000
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
ε
a
ve
ra
ge
 s
ize
 o
f b
ig
ge
st
 c
lu
st
er
µ = 0.5, n=200, f
max
=0,1,2,4,8,16,32
0
1
2
4
8
16
32
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
ε
a
ve
ra
ge
 s
ize
 o
f b
ig
ge
st
 c
lu
st
er
balancing, µ = 0.2, n=200, f
max
=0,1,2,4,8,16,32
0
1
2
4
8
16
32
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
ε
a
ve
ra
ge
 s
ize
 o
f b
ig
ge
st
 c
lu
st
er
curious, µ = 0.2, n=200, f
max
=0,1,2,4,8,16,32
0
1
2
4
8
16
32
Figure 4: The average size of the biggest cluster for initial profiles with 50,
100, 200, 500 and 1000 agents (top left) and µ = 0.5, for 200 balancing/curious
agents with µ = 0.5 (top right), for 200 balancing agents with µ = 0.2 (bottom
left), and 200 curious agents with µ = 0.2 (bottom right).
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Figure 5: Example processes for balancing agents with n = 200 and ε = 0.25.
This demonstrates that cautiousness fosters the positive effect of balancing.
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Figure 6: Example processes for curious agents with n = 200 and µ = 0.2. This
demonstrates that for cautious agents being curious with a high frustration level
one can foster consensus (left hand side) but for a low frustration level it may
destroy consensus (right hand side).
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The upper right plot in figure 4 shows the effect of balancing and curious
agents for µ = 0.5, in which case these two types exhibit the same dynamics. In
the lower plots we distinguish between balancing and curious for agents who are
more cautious, i.e. µ = 0.2. The thin lines show the effects of an increase in the
maximal frustration fmax under a given strategy and µ. The main conclusions
from figure 4 are: Being balancing has a positive effect on the chances for
consensus. For µ = 0.5 this holds for all maximal frustrations fmax > 1. The
same holds trivially for curious agents under µ = 0.5. A smaller µ, which
means being more cautious, supports the positive effects for balancing agents.
However, a smaller µ does not support the positive effects of curious agents.10
Figure 4 is based on aggregated data. To give a more detailed picture of the
dynamics, figures 5 and 6 show some single simulation runs. Figure 5 shows
how balancing agents with an intermediate frustration maximum are positively
effected in finding a consensus by being more cautious. Figure 6 shows the
ambivalent effects of curious agents who are cautious. While a high frustration
maximum can foster consensus, an intermediate frustration maximum may even
prevent consensus. We see that almost every curious agent has to cross the
central opinion if curious agents want to reach a consens. Figures 5 and 6
also illustrate that more chances for consensus by being balancing or curious is
always paid by a longer convergence time.
5 Discussion
Our analytical results describe the possibilities of consensus in the Weisbuch
and Deffuant model and we prove the universality of the consensus threshold in
the sense of Fortunato [11]. Both enforcing and preventing consensus is possible
in a large interval for values of ε and we give an impression of how it scales with
the number of agents and the cautiousness parameter. This shows the large
impact that the control of communication has on consensus formation in the
Weisbuch and Deffuant model in finite populations. Communication control
is a feature of real opinion dynamics, which is to some extent manipulable
through organizations. Therefore, our results are of interest for those who aim at
designing communication and discussion processes and want to foster consensus
or dissent (see for example [22]).
Generally, continuous opinion dynamics under bounded confidence is driven
by the opposition of the consensus-promoting force of averaging and the sep-
arating force of bounded confidence. Dynamics start at the extremes of the
opinion space. Specifically, the most extreme agents move towards less extreme
position and thus higher densities of opinions evolves at both extremes. These
two high density regions attract agents from the center and may lead to a split
10An interesting but small effect is that the general tendency of an increase in chances of
consensus with an increase in fmax is sometimes slightly violated. For instance, for balancing
agents with µ = 0.2 and fmax = 16 we observe a slightly larger average size of the biggest
cluster than for fmax = 32. We suspect that this is a systematic effect and not caused by
chance. However, the effect is so small that we did not further study the causes.
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in the opinion range.
We explored by simulation the dynamics of societies where each individual
behaves balancing or curious. Balancing agents tend to move in a narrow zigzag
around their first opinion, while curious agents tend to move in a wide zigzag
exploring almost the whole opinion space. Therefore, both strategies have a
tendency to prevent a rapid clustering. Balancing agents do this by seeking
input from both sides, which prevents them from quickly being absorbed by a
nearby cluster. Curious agents tend to run through and finally break out of a
cluster they recently joined. They tend to explore more of the opinion space.
Since only the clustering is slowed down, while the overall contraction process
of the opinion profile keeps its speed, the chances for consensus are increased.
We further extend the analyses in [9, 19] on the role of the cautiousness
parameter µ. Particularly in the first part of this paper we see that cautiousness
significantly controls the possibility of consensus. Furthermore, the second part
of the paper illustrates the intriguing interplay of this parameter with agents’
communication strategies.
To summarize, if you want your agents to foster consensus by balancing,
you should appeal to them to be cautious. If you want them to foster consensus
by being curious you should appeal to them not to be cautious, otherwise you
may even get a negative effect when agents have a low frustration maximum.
This results from the fact that balancing agents prevent clustering by trying to
avoid early absorption into a clusters and thus smaller steps, i.e. smaller µ, have
a positive effect on formation of consensus. Curious agents prevent clustering
by getting out of clusters they recently entered; hence, smaller steps have a
negative effect. In general, the impact of being balancing is higher than that of
being curious, yet both individual strategies can foster consensus.
A Appendix for proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The left inequality results from the fact that an ε < maxi∈n−1 ∆xi(0)
can obviously not bridge the maximal gap; thus, the opinion profile will be
divided into the two groups above and below this gap forever, regardless of any
communication structure.
To show the right inequality, let ε > maxi∈n−1
∑i−1
j=0 µ
j∆xi−j(0). We will
show that our specific communication regime, the phone chain of closest, drives
the dynamic to a consensus.
First, the phone chain of closest can not change the order of the opinion
profile. Thus, it holds for all t ∈ N0 that x1(t) ≤ · · · ≤ xn(t).
In a first step we will look at the n− 1 first time steps, thus the first phone
chain round. After one round we will see that the maximal gap in ∆x(n − 1)
has shrunk substantially and we can conclude with an inductive argument.
Let us consider that there is no bounded confidence restriction by ε, thus in
every time step two opinions really change (if they are not already equal). We
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will derive equations for ∆x in the time steps 1, . . . , n−1 under this assumption.
After that we will see that ε does not restrict this dynamic.
Let i ∈ n− 1 be an arbitrary agent. We focus on ∆xi the gap between i and
i + 1 for all time steps and will deduce formulae only containing values of the
initial profile. Agent i at time step i− 1 has communicated recently with agent
i− 1 and will communicate with agent i+ 1. Thus
∆xi(i− 2) = · · · = ∆xi(1) = ∆xi(0). (5)
Due to the communication with agent i − 1, agent i moves towards i − 1 thus
∆xi gets larger.
∆xi(i− 1) = ∆xi(i− 2) + µ∆xi−1(i− 2) (6)
By recursion of (5) and (6) it follows that
∆xi(i− 1) = ∆xi(0) + µ∆xi−1(0) + . . .
· · ·+ µi−2∆x2(0) + µi−1∆x1(0)
=
i−1∑
j=0
µj∆xi−j(0) (7)
Going one step further to the communication of i and i+ 1 where their opinion
gets closer we get the following:
∆xi(i) = ∆xi(i− 1)− 2µ∆xi(i− 1) (8)
We use ∆xi(i− 1) as an abbreviation for the right hand side of (7) which only
contains expressions at time step 0.
In the next step ∆xi becomes larger as agent i+1 moves towards agent i+2.
∆xi(i+ 1) = ∆xi(i) + µ∆xi+1(i)
(8)(6)
= (1− 2µ)∆xi(i− 1) + . . .
+µ(∆xi+1(i− 1) + µ∆xi(i− 1))
(5)
= µ∆xi+1(0) + (1− 2µ+ µ2)∆xi(i− 1)
(9)
To complete all time steps until t = n− 1 we have to mention
∆xi(i+ 1) = ∆xi(i+ 2) = · · · = ∆xi(n− 1). (10)
For ∆xn−1 there is no equation (9) the last value after the phone chain round
is computed by equation (8).
To make all these equations valid and thus to ensure that no opinion change
is prevented by ε, it must hold for all i ∈ n− 1 that ∆Xi(i − 1) < ε. Looking
at (7) we see that this is the case by construction of the lower bound of ε.
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From Equation (7), (9) and (10) we get
∆xi(n− 1) = µ∆xi+1(0)+
+(1− 2µ+ µ2)∑i−1j=0 µj∆xi−j(0)
≤
(
µ+ (1− 2µ+ µ2)∑i−1j=0 µj)max ∆x(0)
=
(
µ+ (1− µ)2 (1−µi)1−µ
)
max ∆x(0)
= (1− µi + µi+1) max ∆x(0)
(11)
Thus it holds max ∆x(n− 1) ≤ (1− µi + µi+1) max ∆x(0). It is easy to see
that k := 1− µi + µi+1 < 1 for 0 < µ < 1.
For the next phone chain rounds we can conclude with the same procedure
and it will hold that max ∆x(t(n − 1)) ≤ kt max ∆x(0). Thus max ∆x(t) con-
verges to zero, which implies that the process converges to a consensus. 
A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. With abbreviation x := x(0) we use the equations range(x) =∑n−1
i=1 ∆xi to derive range(x) ≤ d range(x)max ∆(x)emax ∆x. This gives
n−1∑
i=1
∆xi ≤
d range(x)max ∆(x) e∑
i=1
max ∆(x) (12)
and therefore
εlow ≤ max
i∈n−1
i−1∑
j=0
µj∆xi−j ≤
d rangexmax ∆(x) e∑
i=0
µi−1 max ∆(x) (13)
Taking the right-hand side of (12) and transforming it to 1−µ
d range(x)max ∆x e
1−µ max ∆x
finally provides us with corollary 1. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma 1 Let x(0) ∈ Rn be an initial profile and (x(t))t∈N0 be a process in a
WD model of opinion dynamics with arbitrary ε, µ. For every time step t ∈ N0
it holds that
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi(t) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi(0). (14)
Proof. Obvious by definition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let ε ≤ εhigh. Let us divide the set of agents
according to the maximal k in equation (4) into two subsets I1 = {1, . . . , k}, I2 =
{k + 1, . . . , n}. We choose a communication regime where both subgroups find
their respective consensus x1 = · · · = xk = c1, xk+1 = · · · = xn = c2. This
should be possible, otherwise we are have established a persistent dissence. Due
to lemma 1 and equation 4 it holds |c1 − c2| ≥ ε and communication is not
possible between the subgroups any more. 
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B Appendix for pseudo code
For balancing agents we use:
1: initialize X[]
2: initialize D[] = (0,0,...,0)
3: WHILE not clustered(X) AND changes possible
4: choose agent i,j
5: IF |X[i]-X[j]| <= epsilon
6: IF (X[j]-X[i])*D[i] >= 0 AND (X[j]-X[i])*D[i] >= 0
7: X[i]=X[i] - mu*(X[i]-X[j])
8: X[j]=X[j] + mu*(X[i]-X[j])
9: D[i] = + sign(X[i]-X[j]) * fmax
10: D[j] = - sign(X[i]-X[j]) * fmax
11: ELSE
12: IF D[i]!=0
13: D[i]= D[i] - sign(D[i])
14: ENDIF
15: IF D[j]!=0
16: D[j]= D[j] - sign(D[j])
17: ENDIF
18: ENDIF
19: ENDIF
20: ENDWHILE
For curious agents we use same code with signs switched in lines nine and ten.
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